In a recent High Court decisioni, in proceedings which I was not a party to, Twomey J. associated me with what he called “serial litigants, who are relentlessly pursuing hopeless and vexatiousiiclaims, [inflicting] injustice on innocent parties [and] making a mockery of the courts system”. Furthermore, he described me as “an individual litigant, with nothing to lose, abusing court process and using the courts system to inflict injustice on other litigants” by reference to a decision in Gaultier v Reillyiii of Meenan J. (Binchy J. and O’Moore J. concurring). Here is my reply…! 8.10.2025, by Arnaud GAULTIER
i Ulster Bank v McDonagh (3) 2024 IEHC 609
ii Vexatious in the legal sense of the term: “proceeding initiated maliciously and without Probable Cause by an individual who is not acting in Good Faith for the purpose of annoying or embarrassing an opponent”
iii Gaultier v Reilly [2024] IECA 103 & [2024] IECA 254
First and foremost, I am neither a serial nor a lay litigant but an unrepresented litigant who believes in availing of an effective remedy when wronged. I strongly believe in Justice and its proper administration. As highlighted by O’Donnell J. (as he was then) in Nash v DPPi, the “administration of justice” is in undefined terms in the Constitution [except for the fact that it is to be administered in public to ensure the scrutiny of the Judicial Processii and accountability of judges].
However, my experience with the Irish Judiciary shows that Judges of the Superior Courts have a tendency to first choose the conclusion which they desireiii and then hand-pick the elements of the parties’ submissions which fit their chosen conclusion. But this practice can not be called Justice: it is pure arbitrariness! I opine that any such arbitrary decision is void ab initio and that the judges authoring same should be held liableiv for same.
The above seems to be confirmed by the doctrine enounced by O’Dalaigh C.J. in the State (Quinn) v Ryanv which said: “What has not been argued has not been decided”. It seems to require that a judicial decision has to address the argument of a party, despite Allen J.’s recent attempt to misinterpret / downgrade this doctrine to the bare rank of “an observation”vi.
See below the full article in pdf format.
i [2017] IESC 51
ii Principle of Open Justice, Irish Times v Ireland [1998] 1 I.R. 359
iii Judges might be following the recommendation of Kearns P. in his final address where he said: “Judges should never put themselves in the position of realising, too late, that a particular decision has opened a Pandora's Box of unintended consequences which if proper consideration had been applied, might have led to a different approach being taken. He said this was particularly the case where the boundaries of judicial and executive function intersected.” http://www.rte.ie/news/2015/1218/754931-high-court-president/
iv It is opined that a Judge's Article 34 Declaration/Oath of Office is what gives them licence to adjudicate. When a judge fails to adhere to their Oath of Office they are deemed to have vacated their office (see Article 58 of the Constitution). When they act as a judge having vacated their office they are unlawfully exercising a function of government contrary to Section 6 of the Offences Against the State Act.
v [1965] 1 IR 70 p.120
vi [2025] IECA 93 §12